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Individual levels of impulsivity and anticipated physiological rewards (i.e., thrill) 
associated with offending have both been recognized as important aspects of the 
criminal decision-making calculus. However, the extant literature does not have a clear 
understanding of the dynamics between the two constructs and crime, specifically how 
physiological rewards matter in the impulsivity-offending relationship. Using the dual-
process framework of decision making, this thesis explores first whether impulsivity 
influence offending indirectly through perceived physiological rewards, and second 
whether individuals are differentially susceptible to physiological rewards according to 
their levels of impulsivity (i.e. moderation). These hypotheses are tested using two 
waves of the Pathways to Desistance study. The results provide support that 
physiological rewards partially mediate the relationship between impulsivity and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Rewards” is a multidimensional construct that generally refers to events that 
produce a positive experience (White, 2011). In criminology, the notion that anticipated 
rewards shape offending behavior is a central argument in both rational choice theory 
(Becker, 1968) and social learning theory (Akers, 1985, 1998). In rational choice 
theory, rewards comprise a substantial component of the utility function and, in social 
learning theory, rewards are essential for the reinforcement process of learning 
behaviors. Empirical studies consistently show that rewards are related to criminal 
offending (Baker & Piquero, 2010) and strong predictors of deviant behaviors 
(Goldberg et al., 2002). Many types of rewards are found to be related to crime, like 
monetary rewards (e.g., Hochstetler et al., 2007; Uggen & Kruttschnitt, 1998) and 
social rewards (e.g., Akers, 1998; Hoeben & Thomas, 2019). Additionally, some 
scholars highlight the importance of physiological rewards, such as feeling a thrill or 
rush when engaging in criminal offending (Katz, 1988; Matsueda et al., 2006; Thomas 
et al., 2020). Unlike other rewards, the feeling of thrill or rush are often immediately 
experienced during the act rather than delayed, and the probability of experiencing thrill 
is often definite rather than uncertain (Katz, 1988). Further, physiological rewards are 
reported as one of the primary drives for why individuals commit certain offenses 
(Pfefferbaum & Wood, 1994).   
Importantly, these physiological rewards may play a role in further elucidating 
the relationship between impulsivity and offending. Impulsivity is regularly found to 
be related to higher offending (Lynam & Miller, 2004), and it is a factor that can notably 





levels of impulsivity tend to place more emphasis on immediate rewards and are more 
sensation seeking (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Lynam & Miller, 2004; Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2001). Those who are more impulsive also tend to overvalue the thrill and rush 
of criminal offending (Katz, 1988; Pfefferbaum & Wood, 1994). Therefore, taking 
physiological rewards into consideration may help researchers understand more about 
the relationship between impulsivity and offending.  
Dual-process theories can be a helpful framework in exploring how impulsivity 
and rewards matter in individual decision making. The dual-process theories suggest 
that there are two types of reasoning processes in judgement and decision making; one 
is autonomous and the other involves hypothetical thinking (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Stanovich, 2011). The relative weight given to each system during choice making is 
dependent upon individual attributes like impulsivity (Kahneman, 2011). For instance, 
individuals who are more impulsive have a tendency to rely on Type I over Type II 
processes when making decisions, because they are apt to primarily engage in fast and 
autonomic thinking. Whereas those with lower levels of impulsivity tend to engage in 
slow, deliberate Type II processing, overriding the fast Type I processing (Hofmann et 
al., 2009).  
There is evidence that suggests possible mediating and moderating pathways in 
how impulsivity and rewards affect criminal decision making. For mediation, scholars 
suggest that individuals who are more impulsive anticipate higher immediate rewards 
compared to those who are less impulsive (Hahn et al., 2009; Kerr et al., 2015). In other 
words, it is possible that one of the reasons impulsivity is related to offending is because 





impulsivity may increase one’s susceptibility to physiological rewards of crime 
because it provides immediate and certain gratification that can be more affected by a 
tendency of rapid Type I processing. That is, individuals with higher impulsivity are 
more sensitive to immediate physiological rewards because they tend to engage in Type 
I processes of decision making and tend less to utilize Type II processing. In addition, 
impulsivity is related to greater reward discounting (i.e., the overvaluation of 
immediate versus delayed rewards; Ainslie, 1975; Bechara & Damasio, 2002; da Matta 
et al., 2012), which suggests overweighing of physiological rewards for more impulsive 
people.  
The full model of offending decision making should not only examine the 
influence of impulsivity on criminal behaviors, but also explore how immediate 
benefits of crime may matter for the relationship between certain personal attributes 
and crime. The current thesis examines first whether the impact of impulsivity on 
offending is indirect through the mediating relationship of physiological rewards, and 
second whether physiological rewards are differentially salient based on one’s level of 
impulsivity. The question is addressed by leveraging longitudinal data from the 
Pathways to Desistance study, a study of serious juvenile offenders. In the end, this 
thesis will further assist the literature in clarifying potential mediating and moderating 









Chapter 2: The Dual-Process Framework of Decision Making 
Human decision making and reasoning have long intrigued scholars. One set of 
theories proposed to organize and understand human choice calculus is the dual-process 
theories. While there are various articulations of the dual-process model in many areas 
of research, they converge around a similar organization. The general framework of the 
dual-process models in judgement and decision making can be separated into two 
interdependent types of processing: Type I and Type II (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000), also 
known as the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ systems, fast and slow systems, or impulsive and 
reflective systems (see discussion in Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Skinner & Zimmer-
Gembeck, 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; van Gelder & de Vries, 2012, 2014). The 
two types of information processing can be viewed as antagonistic and they regulate 
and interact with each other during choice calculation. Some theorists assume the 
default-interactionist structure for the two processing, hypothesizing that Type I 
process will produce the default intuitive response in a given situation unless Type II 
process intervenes and takes over (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002; Stanovich, 2011). 
The two types of processes can be distinguished via several defining features plus 
typical correlates or characteristics often associated with each processing type. Type I 
is defined as being autonomous and does not require working memory, meaning that it 
does not demand controlled attention (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). It is typically 
associated with being automatic, lower order, more immediate, and having fast 





decision making to situational factors with little information or conscious processing, 
and it is associated with heuristics (Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich 
& West, 2000). Heuristics are “fast and frugal” mental shortcuts or strategies that make 
decision making simpler by ignoring excess information or utilizing stereotypes or 
experience (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When 
individuals rely on the first type of processing, they may make decisions that often lack 
considerations of future consequences. Type I processing also includes executing rules 
or decision making principles that have been conditioned or learned to the point of 
automation (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). On the other hand, the second type, Type II, 
requires working memory, mental simulation, and it is defined by cognitive decoupling, 
which is the ability to differentiate between beliefs and hypotheses (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Type II processing is often correlated with being logical, calculating, higher 
order, effortful, and deliberate. Its processing is usually slower and more abstract 
(Evans, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). Therefore, the ability to analyze future 
consequences and to guide behavior that aligns with one’s preferences typically 
requires Type II processing (Evans, 2012).  
Neuroimaging studies show that different brain regions are activated when 
participants engage in heavy logic-based problems (Type II) compared to belief or 
reaction-based problems (Type I; De Neys et al., 2008; Tsujii & Watanabe, 2009). 
Experimental studies show that by suppressing working memory or increasing 
participant’s time pressure, both of which decrease Type II processing, the rate of belief 
bias increases and logical accuracy decreases (De Neys, 2006; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 





logical argument on the basis of whether one agrees with the conclusions” (p. 120). For 
example, using an illustration provided from Evans (2012), say one were to ask whether 
the following statement is correct: “if an animal is a dog, then it must have a tail.” A 
default, heuristic Type I response would be “yes.” But after some reflective thinking 
and consideration (i.e., Type II processing), the answer would be “no, not necessarily” 
because not all dogs have a tail.  
A common fallacy supposes that reaction-based Type I thinking is ‘bad’ or error 
prone and reflection-based Type II processing is ‘good’ or rational (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Pennycook et al., 2018). However, errors and cognitive biases are not always 
indicative of Type I thinking, and Type II process is not always responsible for ideal 
reactions in certain situations (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). “Fast and frugal” heuristic-
based thinking, like that in Type I, can be adaptive if it is associated with evolutionary 
development and accumulation from prior experiences (Evans, 2007; Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999). For instance, Type I thinking would be adaptive in an emergency room 
when a patient is experiencing a heart attack and the doctor has to make a prompt 
judgement whether to treat the patient as high-risk or low-risk. Under time constraint, 
using heuristics and cues may result in a better outcome rather than evaluating 
numerous measurements and weighing the possible choices and consequences 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Therefore, a dual-process model provides the framework 
for understanding the mechanisms by which individuals make decisions instead of the 
“rightness” of behavioral outcomes resulting from each process.  
The idea of distinguishing two types of cognitive processes is not entirely new, 





(e.g., Wason & Evans, 1974). Although the dual-process framework, and efforts similar 
to it, was not introduced to criminology until later, scholars have discussed within 
rational choice theory that the offender decision making process is not always rational, 
deliberate, thoughtful, or reasoned (McCarthy, 2002). In the explanation of offending, 
this framework is presented as a way of explaining within- and between-individual 
differences in response to environmental stimuli (i.e., engaging in crime) (de Vries & 
van Gelder, 2013; Mamayek et al., 2015; Paternoster et al., 2011; Paternoster & 
Pogarsky, 2009; Steinberg, 2010; Thomas & McGloin, 2013). Paternoster and 
Pogarsky (2009) explain the variation between people in how decisions are made using 
the notion of thoughtfully reflective decision making (TRDM). In the authors’ words, 
TRDM reflects “the tendency of persons to collect information relevant to a problem 
or decision they must make, to think deliberately, carefully, and thoughtfully about 
possible solutions to the problem, apply reason to the examination of alternative 
solutions, and reflect back upon both the process and the outcome of the choice in order 
to assess what went right and what went wrong” (p.104-105). Similar to Type II 
processing, behavioral outcomes associated with TRDM are those resulting from slow 
and deliberate reasoning that are more consistent with the actor’s preferences. TRDM 
is related to higher education attainment, better health, lower criminal engagement and 
substance use, and various positive life outcomes (Paternoster et al., 2011). In their 
study, Paternoster and colleagues (2011) also find that TRDM is associated to the 
accumulation of higher human, social, and cultural capital.  
Other scholars have also integrated the dual-process framework in works 





hot/cool perspective, similar to Type I and Type II processes, to explain predictors of 
criminal decision making. They find that negative affect (e.g., nervousness) was related 
to the hot processing condition and perceived sanction risk was associated with the cool 
processing condition. Thomas and McGloin (2013) use dual-process theory to explain 
the potential difference in susceptibility to normative peer influence and unstructured 
socializing for individuals with low and high levels of impulsivity. They find that 
adolescents with low impulsivity are more vulnerable to normative influence by deviant 
peers than are those with high levels of impulsivity, potentially because they tend to 
utilize Type II processing more than Type I. Yet, it is less clear from their results 
whether unstructured socializing would have a greater effect on one’s delinquency for 
those with high impulsivity (i.e., individuals who tend to engage in Type I processes). 
Recent efforts integrating the dual-process framework in criminology have not only 
successfully demonstrated its usefulness in explaining variation in offending across 
people but also shown potential in making current explanations of crime more specific 
(Mamayek et al., 2015). Precisely, an avenue to explore is how dual-process theories 
can help us understand how rewards play a role in offending. 
Criminal Rewards and Offending 
Rewards are generally viewed as hedonistic pleasures or sensations (Marks, 
2011). Rewarding events can also elicit positive affective experience which can 
strengthen behaviors  on  which  the  rewards  are  contingent (Thorndike, 1911; White, 
2011). The type of rewards can range from food and sexual stimuli to money and social 





recognized by scholars in criminology. Of  the  many  explanations  of  crime,  two 
theoretical traditions have a core focus on the rewarding aspects of criminal behaviors.  
One  of  the  traditions  is  rational  choice  theory.  This  theory  originates  from  
early utilitarian  perspectives  of  philosophers  like  Bentham  and  it  is  grounded  on  
the assumption that human beings are rational decision makers and that behaviors are 
the results of such rational calculus (e.g., Becker, 1968; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). 
More notably,  Becker’s  (1968)  introduction  of  the  economic  model  of  crime  sets  
the groundwork for contemporary rational choice modeling using economic terms. 
Becker (1968) posits that when the expected utility of an act, be it legal or illegal, is 
greater than the expected utility of the alternative, a rational person would engage in 
the act. In other  words,  a  rational  decision  maker  would  engage  in  criminal  
activities  if  the expected benefits from such activities exceed the expected cost. Hence, 
the major components  involved  in  the  economic  model  include  the  expected  costs  
and  the expected benefits of a criminal act. Furthermore, Clarke and Cornish’s (1985; 
also Cornish & Clarke, 1986) model extends the classical and economic rational choice 
framework by suggesting two stages of choice – initial involvement and criminal event. 
First, individuals must make the decision to be criminally involved, and this decision 
is influenced by their background, prior learning, general needs, and incentives. Then 
the individual will decide the offense to commit using more situational information  
related  to  the  criminal  event  and  immediate  circumstances.  Like  the economic 
model, Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) model also recognizes the importance of rewards 





The second theoretical tradition with a heavy focus on rewards is social learning 
theory, which argues that deviant behavior is learned in the same way as prosocial 
behavior (Cressey, 1960). Developed from Sutherland’s (1947) differential association, 
individuals engage in law-violating acts because of an excess of definitions favorable 
to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law. Akers (1985, 1998) 
extends Sutherland’s notion of differential association by further specifying the process 
through which criminal behaviors are learned and the mechanisms in which the 
transference of criminal definition occurs (see also Burgess & Akers, 1966). Among 
the processes which Akers postulates, differential reinforcement most strongly relates 
to rewards (Akers, 1985, 1998). Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of 
anticipated or actual rewards and punishment consequent to behaviors (Akers, 1985, 
1998). A rewarding outcome reinforces a behavior and increased the probability of that 
behavior being repeated, whereas a punishing outcome discourages a behavior and 
decreases the probability of repeating that behavior. According to social learning 
theory, an individual’s criminal engagement is dependent on their past, present, and 
anticipated future rewards and punishments, which can be social or nonsocial.  
Rewards are not only related to offending theoretically, but also empirically. 
Evidence suggests that various types of rewards consistently predict offending 
outcomes (e.g. Baker & Piquero, 2010; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). Financial rewards 
of crime have been studied in criminology due to the influence of Becker’s (1968) 
economic model, and actual and potential pecuniary returns from illegal activities have 
often been measured and examined under this model to understand the effects of 





examining economic returns, he also acknowledges that the benefits of crime can be 
conceptualized in many ways beyond money. One of such noneconomic rewards are 
the extrinsic social reinforcements, which include a broad range of tangible or 
intangible rewards as well as direct physical or verbal reactions from peers (Akers, 
1998). 
Aside from monetary and social returns, there are nonsocial rewards as well, 
such as physiological or intrinsic rewards. This category of rewards is considered the 
nonsocial rewards suggested by Akers (1998), which are also referred to as 
unconditioned physiological stimuli, physiological rewards, or psychic rewards (Katz, 
1988; Matsueda et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2020). Collectively, these terms cover 
emotional or physiological states which arise when engaging in deviant activities. 
Physiological rewards, like thrill and rush, are motivating factors for some individuals 
to commit crime. Katz’s “Seductions of Crime” (1988) is one of the few works that 
brings intrinsic rewards to the center stage of criminal explanations. Katz elaborates on 
Bordua’s (1961) suggestion that theorists should pay more attention to the enjoyment 
that accompanies offending. In Katz’s (1988) description of physiological rewards, 
which he termed “sneaky thrills,” criminals are often “seduced” into engaging in crime 
due to the prospect of excitement or kicks.  
Excitement and thrill seeking associated with crime have been nominated as 
primary motivators of criminal engagement in adolescents and offenders (Kazemian & 
Le Blanc, 2004; Pfefferbaum & Wood, 1994). These physiological returns are 
considered primary rewards that have innate value necessary for homeostasis and 





immediate (i.e., experienced during the act), short-term, and present (Ferrell, 1997). 
Furthermore, some offenders also refer to the immediate excitement and thrill as 
“adrenaline rush,” and this emotional stimulation is viewed as an integral part of the 
offending experience (Ferrell, 1997).  
Physiological rewards are also related to the concept of sensation-seeking. 
Sensation-seeking is “the extent to which an individual places a strong, absolute, or 
relative emphasis on the pleasures of crime” (Agnew, 2016, p. 184). Another view of 
sensation-seeking is the generalized tendency to seek novelty, excitement, thrill, or fun 
(Zuckerman, 2010), which includes four parts: thrill and adventure seeking, experience 
seeking, disinhibition, and boredom susceptibility (Zuckerman, 1971). Of the 
dimensions, physiological rewards is a critical part of  thrill seeking. Studies find that 
individual who are more inclined to seek thrills and excitement are more likely to 
engage in risky sexual activities (Donohew et al., 2000), substance use (Hittner & 
Swickert, 2006; Magid et al., 2007), and antisocial behaviors (Byck et al., 2015).  
In the dual-process framework, rewards can matter based on their certainty and 
temporal property. Physiological rewards are instantly gratifying and tend to be more 
certain (Katz, 1988), unlike, for example, monetary rewards which have a probability 
of not delivering if one was caught (Wright & Decker, 1997). Under the default-
interactionist perspective, Type I processing provides a rapid default response unless 
inhibited or overridden by Type II processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002). A decision for immediate reward is associated with Type I 
thinking, whereas a mental simulation for a delayed reward requires Type II processing 





reflective Type II processing allows individuals to have the ability to resist from 
immediate gratification of the physiological rewards (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Therefore, a greater tendency for Type I process over the regulatory systems (i.e., Type 
II) will result in a higher likelihood of decisions driven by immediate rewards (Geier 
& Luna, 2009). Furthermore, evidence shows distinct neural systems of decision 
making for immediate or delayed monetary rewards that are potentially associated to 
Type I and Type II processes (McClure et al., 2004), suggesting that an increase in 
regions related to heightened reward reactivity may bias one’s decision toward 
immediate rewards (Geier, 2013). The immediacy and certainty of physiological 
rewards are also important in the discussion of the characteristics and behavioral 
tendencies associated with impulsivity. 
Impulsivity and Offending 
Impulsivity is a complex construct with many definitions across different 
disciplines (Bakhshani, 2014). From a personality perspective, it reflects a tendency to 
make up one’s mind quickly, to engage in unplanned risky behaviors (Eysenck, 1993), 
and to act with little considerations of the future (Dickman, 1993). Biological, 
neurological, and cognitive viewpoints characterize impulsivity as a failure to inhibit 
impulses (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007; Chudasama, 2011), and from a behavioralist 
perspective, impulsivity is described as not being able to consider various 
consequences and inability to delay gratification (Evenden, 1999; Monterosso & 
Ainslie, 1999). The overlap across the multiple definitions generally covers a tendency 
for urgency and a lack of premeditation (e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977; Lynam & 





Many areas of research and clinical work have discussed the influence of 
impulsivity on behavior. Impulsivity plays a prominent role in theories of personality 
(e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978), diagnoses of psychopathology (e.g., American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), as well as explanations of psychopathy (e.g., Lynam, 
1996) and substance abuse (Wills et al., 1994). One’s level of impulsivity and related 
individual characteristics have also been examined in criminology. Impulsivity as a 
construct holds theoretical importance, and it also has strong empirical relationship 
with offending behaviors (Baron, 2003; Cooper et al., 2003; White et al., 1994; Wright 
et al., 2004). Individuals with higher levels of impulsivity are more likely to offend 
(e.g., Bechtold et al., 2014), engage in more delinquent behaviors (Pratt & Cullen, 
2000), begin offending at an earlier age (Carroll et al., 2006), and continue offending 
(Monahan et al., 2009).  
Theoretically, proponents of the criminal propensity perspective argue that there 
are enduring individual differences between offenders and non-offenders that are 
related to one’s level of impulsivity. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) propose that 
offenders have certain personality traits which include the inability to delay 
gratification and a lack of capability to plan for the future. Similarly, Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) contend that offenders and non-offenders differ in their levels of self-
control. In their proposition, offenders who lack self-control are also impulsive, unable 
to defer gratification, and discount delayed consequences. In addition, Grasmick and 
colleagues’ (1993) widely-used scale for measuring self-control includes impulsivity 





Although self-control in the general theory of crime is thought to include 
impulsivity, self-regulation, and risk taking (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Grasmick et 
al., 1993), it is important to highlight they are three related but empirically distinct 
constructs (Burt, 2020; Hofmann et al., 2009; Mamayek et al., 2015; Nigg, 2017). Burt 
and colleagues (2014) and Forrest and colleagues (2019) demonstrate that “self-
control,” as traditionally defined, may be composed of two elements – impulsivity and 
risk-taking – which have their own developmental trajectories. Moreover, Mamayek 
and colleagues (2015, 2017) redefine self-control as self-regulation, which is the ability 
to supersede impulsive tendencies, and they suggest that impulsivity should be thought 
of as the motivation or drive and self-regulation as the restraint. Mamayek and 
colleagues (2017) further demonstrate that impulsivity and self-control are empirically 
distinct and predict intentions to offend differently. In psychology and neuroscience, 
impulsivity and self-control are two different and antagonistic concepts (Kalenscher et 
al., 2006; Nigg, 2017). In a review of the terminologies and studies of self-control and 
other related constructs, Nigg (2017) states that self-control (or inhibition) is the 
intrinsic regulation of action, emotion, and cognition. On the other hand, impulsivity is 
viewed as “nonreflective selection or preference for the immediately rewarding 
response” (p. 370).  
Importantly, individual levels of impulsivity can influence decision making. 
Individuals with higher levels of impulsivity are apt to make decisions based on non-
cognitive cues, such as affective and physiological cues (e.g., excitement), as opposed 
to evaluating the consequences (Donohew et al., 2000). This suggests that more 





Moreover, the dual-process framework can be helpful in understanding how 
impulsivity affects decision making and reasoning. The difference between the two 
types of reasoning processes has often been shown to map on to individual levels of 
impulsivity (e.g., Thomas & McGloin, 2013; van Gelder & de Vries, 2012). One can 
find similarities in the language used to describe the dual processes and aspects of 
impulsivity (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009). For example, 
Paterson and Newman (1993) discuss impulsive behaviors as “directly related to lack 
of prospective reflection or, in other words, a lack of planful thought and sound 
judgement” (p. 722) and Nigg (2017) discusses impulsivity as “nonreflective selection” 
(p. 370). These two descriptions of impulsivity are similar to the characteristics (or 
absence) of Type II processing. A defining feature of Type II process is the ability to 
“create temporary models of the world and test out actions (or alternative causes)” (p. 
22), which requires planning, reflection, and judgement (Stanovich, 2011).  
Engagement in Type I and Type II reasoning involves different levels of self-
regulation, and the tendency to utilize one type of processing over the other differs 
across persons and across situations within persons (Kahneman, 2011). Individuals 
with higher levels of impulsivity are apt to make reactive decisions and engage in less 
deliberate activities, resulting in behaviors utilizing Type I decision making more. In 
contrast, individuals with lower levels of impulsivity are hypothesized to engage in 
Type II decision making more (Kahneman, 2011). In an experiment, individuals who 
are more impulsive, more impatient, and less able to defer gratification are more likely 
to utilize Type I thinking and produce more errors based on intuitions and heuristics 





systems interact with each other to produce certain behavioral decisions, but 
individuals may differ on the weight they attribute to each system depending on their 
level of impulse control (Hofmann et al., 2009). For example, the risk of drinking and 
driving is highest for individuals who are more impulsive (i.e., Type I thinking) and 
have less self-regulation (i.e., Type II thinking), whereas individuals with inverse 
characteristics (i.e., low impulsivity and high self-regulation) showed the lowest 
intentions to drink and drive (Mamayek et al., 2015). These studies may suggest that 
certain factors may pose differential risks to individuals with varying levels of 
impulsivity as they may affect their decision making processing. 
Integration of Criminal Rewards and Impulsivity 
The language used in the impulsivity literature often overlaps with the concept 
of rewards. In describing impulsivity, some scholars have viewed it as the preference 
for and overvaluation of immediate rewards (Ainslie, 1975). Some state that individuals 
with higher impulsivity are unable to resist immediate rewards in exchange for delayed 
rewards (i.e., deferred gratification; Monterosso & Ainslie, 1999). A common-ground 
between impulsivity and rewards merge in the discussion of reward discounting. This 
pattern of discounting is referred to as hyperbolic discounting or present bias in the 
psychology and economics literature (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999, 2015). In general, 
it posits that human actions are biased towards the present moment, but the proposed 
functional form of the discounting varies slightly across psychologists and economists 
(O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2015). The process implies that when an individual is presented 
with the option of an immediate reward or a delayed reward, values for the two rewards 





(da Matta et al., 2012). Individuals who discount or decrease the value of a delayed 
reward at a higher rate are more biased towards choosing the immediate option (da 
Matta et al., 2012). Although people in general discount rewards that are more distant 
in the future, individuals higher in impulsivity show a more pronounced decline in their 
function of reward discounting (Ainslie, 1975; Lutz & Widmer, 2014). In other words, 
more impulsive individuals tend to place higher values on short-term rewards (Hoeben 
& Thomas, 2019; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008) and they tend to prefer an instant but 
smaller reward instead of a larger delayed reward (Ainslie, 1975; Peters & Büchel, 
2010; Steinberg et al., 2009), suggesting an overvaluation of short-term rewards 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Kurth‐Nelson et al., 2012) or greater sensitivity to 
immediate rewards (Martin & Potts, 2004; Moeller et al., 2001).  
It is possible that the discounting of future rewards is a consequence of the 
increased uncertainty of delayed rewards and the certainty of immediate rewards 
(Ainslie, 1975; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2015). People tend to prefer the outcome with a 
certain gain over an alternative with some risk of losing, known as the certainty effect 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This is true even when the probabilistic outcome has a 
higher expected value than the certain one. Estle and colleagues (2007) find that when 
reward is certain, the discounting rate for primary rewards tend to be steeper than that 
of monetary rewards. On the other hand, when reward is probabilistic, there is no 
difference in the discounting of primary and monetary rewards (Estle et al., 2007).  
Another perspective on the relationship between rewards and impulsivity is that 
neuroimaging research suggests impulsivity is associated with mainly two regions of 





amygdala) and the other related to hedonic anticipation of rewards (i.e., striatum and 
anterior cingulate cortex) (Kerr et al., 2015). For instance, studies find that individual 
level of impulsivity is correlated with greater anticipation of monetary rewards (Hahn 
et al., 2009) and primary rewards (Kerr et al., 2015). Kerr and colleagues (2015) 
demonstrate that after participants are given a reward cue or stimuli, impulsivity is 
positively correlated with higher anticipation activity in regions related to reward 
sensitivity. Another study also suggest greater impulsivity or hyperactivation in regions 
related to increased expectancy of an immediately available reward (Bouchard et al., 
2012). In other words, this may suggest that individuals with higher impulsivity tend 
to expect greater immediate rewards than those with lower impulsivity.  
Despite the overlap between impulsivity and rewards, scholars state that they 
are distinct concepts, and the similarity results from the strong relationship between the 
two concepts rather than having the same underlying construct. Dawe and Loxton 
(2004) and other scholars (e.g., Caseras et al., 2003; Franken & Muris, 2006; Miller et 
al., 2004; Moeller et al., 2001; Quilty & Oakman, 2004) suggest that impulsive 
behavior has two parts, with the first domain representing a tendency to act rashly and 
a lack of evaluation of consequences (i.e., rash impulsivity) and the second domain 
characterized by enhanced sensitivity towards rewards, especially immediate rewards. 
Evidence shows that reward sensitivity and impulsivity both affect the increased 
likelihood of drug use, but they provide independent contributions to the initiation, 
continuation, and abstinence in substance use (Dawe et al., 2004; de Wit & Richards, 
2004). Additionally, the two constructs are correlated to activation in different neural 





the two concepts can elucidate to specific mechanisms of how rewards are involved in 
the association of impulsivity and offending. 
Physiological Rewards and Mediation 
Neuroimaging studies and the dual-process theories can shed light on the 
potential mediating pathway of rewards. Impulsivity is positively associated with 
activation in the more immediate and primary brain regions, such as the ventral striatum 
(Hariri et al., 2006), and heightened ventral striatum activity is also related to individual 
tendency to respond to primary, immediate, and short-term rewards (Galván, 2013; 
Hariri et al., 2006; McClure et al., 2004). Additionally, impulsivity is associated with 
greater activation in brain regions related to reward anticipation (Bouchard et al., 2012; 
Hahn et al., 2009; Kerr et al., 2015). Although the neuroimaging studies here are 
correlational and are not evidence of causal mechanisms, it is reasonable to question 
whether more impulsive individuals may show greater reward anticipation leading to a 
higher likelihood of engaging in behaviors in order to receive the reward.  
The dual-process framework suggests that individuals with higher impulsivity 
tend to rely on Type I processing and often lack Type II thinking when making 
decisions (Kahneman, 2011). Moreover, their expectation of reward tends to be 
represented by the heuristic process and influenced by the anticipation of positive affect 
(e.g., excitement) (Quartz, 2009). Therefore, individuals with higher impulsivity may 
anticipate greater physiological rewards due to reliance on Type I processing that can 
be biased by feelings and excitement. Individuals who are more impulsive may likely 
perceive and anticipate greater immediate physiological rewards compared to those 





delinquency as higher, the likelihood of engagement in the behavior should increase as 
well.  
Compared to the moderation hypothesis discussed below, there are fewer 
studies that discuss the mediating relationship that physiological rewards may have on 
impulsivity and crime. Nagin and Paternoster (1993) suggest that low self-control may 
be indirectly associated with offending intent via perceived criminal utility (i.e., 
perceived psychic rewards), sanctions, and shame. Piquero and Tibbetts (1996) also 
find that the relationship between low self-control and intention of shoplifting or drunk 
driving is mediated through perceived pleasure (i.e., fun or kick) of offending. Even 
though both studies use Grasmick and colleagues’ (1993) measure of low self-control 
with impulsivity included instead of directly testing impulsivity, they still suggest the 
potential influence of an individual’s perception of criminal rewards. These scholars 
hint that impulsivity may affect offending through indirect pathways, but few have 
tested impulsivity or physiological rewards specifically. 
Physiological Rewards and Moderation 
It has been suggested that impulsivity may increase one’s vulnerability to other 
criminogenic risks, including the attractions and incentives for deviant behaviors (e.g., 
Lynam et al., 2000). Studies demonstrate that impulsivity may interact with deviant 
peer association (Vitulano et al., 2010) and neighborhood context (Lynam et al., 2000; 
Zimmerman, 2010) to influence offending. For instance, the relationship between 
impulsivity and juvenile offending tends to be higher in poorer neighborhoods 
compared to more affluent neighborhoods (Lynam et al., 2000). Moreover, impulsivity 





(Lynam & Miller, 2004; Mann et al., 2018; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Individuals 
with higher levels of impulsivity are not only more likely to offend (Lynam & Miller, 
2004; Matsueda et al., 2006) but also tend to find the thrill of crime as more rewarding 
(Pfefferbaum & Wood, 1994). In addition, individuals who are more sensation-seeking 
tend to view crime or risky activities as more rewarding and pleasurable (Katz, 1988). 
Under the concept of reward discounting, individuals with higher impulsivity 
have a steeper discounting function for delayed rewards, and the value of perceived 
short-term immediate rewards tend to be overestimated (Ainslie, 1975; O’Donoghue & 
Rabin, 2015; Peters & Büchel, 2010). Additionally, individuals who tend to place a 
greater value for immediate rewards also have a tendency to place greater value on 
more certain rewards as well (Green & Myerson, 2004). Physiological rewards are 
often immediately felt during the criminal act and have a higher certainty of receipt 
(Ferrell, 1997; Katz, 1988). Hence, highly impulsive individuals may overvalue short-
term immediate rewards (Ainslie, 1975; Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Hoeben & 
Thomas, 2019), which may make them more susceptible to the physiological rewards 
of crime.  
Individuals who are more impulsive are inclined to make decisions based on 
non-cognitive cues, like thrill or excitement (Donohew et al., 2000). Under dual-
process theories, those who are more impulsive already have the tendency to utilize 
Type I over Type II process (Hofmann et al., 2009; Kahneman, 2011), making them 
more vulnerable to the cues of criminal attraction (Mamayek et al., 2015). For instance, 
impulsivity can make one more susceptible to immediately rewarding stimuli by 





(Geier & Luna, 2009). The more distant and uncertain a reward is, the more it requires 
cognitive processes, like that of Type II decision making, to process the value of the 
reward (Kurth‐Nelson et al., 2012; Stahl et al., 2014). In this case, individuals with 
higher impulsivity may weight immediate physiological rewards greater than those 
with lower levels of impulsivity, making them more vulnerable to engage in criminal 
activities when these rewards are present. 
Current Study 
Prior studies that have looked at the relationship between rewards and offending 
have primarily included impulsivity (or self-control) as a control for the models (e.g., 
Carmichael & Piquero, 2004; Matsueda et al., 2006). Or the inclusion of rewards and 
impulsivity is used to compare focal correlates from different theories (e.g., Baron, 
2003; Wright et al., 2004). For instance, researchers include rewards and impulsivity 
in the same regression model as a means to compare the explanatory power for social 
learning theory and the general theory of crime (see discussion in Pratt et al., 2010; 
Pratt & Cullen, 2000). Prior studies allude to the potential of moderating relationship 
between impulsivity and rewards but few tests the effect (Sellers, 1999). Evidence for 
the direct effects of impulsivity on offending and rewards on offending is quite strong. 
However, the current literature is still unclear regarding how rewards matter as part of 
the process that connects impulsivity and criminal behavior. Without the knowledge of 
how rewards of crime may affect the impulsivity-offending relationships, the extant 






Using the Pathways to Desistance data, the current thesis examines what 
potential role physiological rewards play in explaining the relationship between 
impulsivity and crime. From the arguments made above, I have two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Perceived physiological rewards will mediate the relationship 
between impulsivity and offending.  
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between perceived physiological rewards and 
offending will be stronger for individuals with higher levels of impulsivity. 
The Pathways to Desistance sample can provide insight into the decision-making 
calculus for serious juvenile offenders. The Pathways data allow for investigation into 
physiological rewards for self-reported offending behaviors. In addition, the 
longitudinal aspect of the Pathways data allows us to establish temporal ordering in the 
offending outcome and predictors. In the end, the current thesis will contribute to the 
existing literature by exploring whether the relationship between impulsivity and 
offending can be mediated or moderated by physiological rewards. Using the dual-
process framework, this will provide more clarity and specificity to the existing 





Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
Data and Sample 
Data from the multi-site Pathways to Desistance Study are used in the current 
thesis. The study consists of 1,354 serious juvenile offenders from Phoenix, AZ (i.e., 
Maricopa County, N=654) and Philadelphia, PA (N=700). Participants in the study 
were followed from adolescence into young adulthood over 11 waves between 2000 
and 2010. The participants were all found guilty of a serious offense, comprising mostly 
of felonies or serious misdemeanors (i.e., weapon offense or sexual assault), and they 
were also between the ages of 14 and 18 at the time of their committing offense. To 
preserve heterogeneity in offense type, the sample capped drug offenses for male 
offenders at 15% at each site because drug offenses accounted for a large portion of all 
offenses committed by juveniles, especially males (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). Two 
thousand and eight eligible individuals were approached for the study, and 1,354 
consented to participate, resulting in a 67% response rate. Follow-up interviews were 
conducted every 6 months for 3 years and then every 12 months for another 4 years 
(i.e., 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 48, 60, 72, 84 months after initial baseline interview) with 
an average retention rate of 89.5%. 
The current thesis uses data from waves 2 and 3 (6-month and 12-month 
interviews) because they provide the largest sample size and the least amount of 
missing data of any other follow-up interviews. Wave 1 is not used due to the fact that 
the impulsivity measure was not collected until wave 2. To account for temporal 
ordering, covariates at wave 2 are used to predict the outcomes at wave 3. Namely, 





outcomes are from wave 3. Despite the fact that impulsivity and physiological rewards 
are both taken from the same wave, the correct temporal ordering may be established 
by the wording of the questionnaires. Although impulsivity is not constant across an 
individual’s life-course, it tends not to fluctuate greatly within short periods of time 
(Burt et al., 2014; Forrest et al., 2019). Thus, although the data capture the respondents’ 
current impulsivity at wave 2, one may reasonably assume that this attribute was 
relatively stable in the prior months. Because the rewards question asks participants 
their current perceptions about the thrill or rush associated with engaging in criminal 
acts, it is not unreasonable to view it as a potential mediator.   
Using a sample of serious juvenile offenders to test the hypotheses under focus 
here does pose certain limitations. Due to data collection procedures and sample 
characteristics, the current sample is neither random nor representative of adolescents 
at large or even the general juvenile offender population, which largely limits the 
generalization of any findings beyond this sample. Moreover, a serious delinquent 
sample may not include many individuals with low levels of impulsivity given that it 
is positively associated with greater criminal engagement (e.g., Monahan et al., 2009; 
White et al., 1994). Hence, compared to a general sample of adolescents, the current 
sample has a higher probability of capturing the right end of the impulsivity 
distribution. This may limit the study’s ability to detect differences between individuals 
with ‘lower’ impulsivity and those with higher impulsivity because of the narrower 
variation in the sample. This may be true for perceived physiological rewards as well 
because thrill and rush of crime are also correlated with higher offending behaviors 





Despite the shortcomings of the Pathways dataset, it does have the benefit of 
allowing for the examination of perceived physiological rewards, impulsivity, and 
detailed self-reported offending behaviors. Even though the variation of impulsivity 
and physiological rewards in a serious offender sample may be smaller compared to a 
general sample, there is still heterogeneity within this sample. And although findings 
from the current sample cannot be generalized, it is still worthy of investigation as it 
may assist in examining how physiological rewards play a role for those with higher 
levels of impulsivity or for those who are already involved in the criminal justice 
system. Historically, there is a substantial portion of influential criminological research 
built on nonrepresentative samples/serious offenders that have contributed greatly to 
our understanding of the explanation of crime (e.g., Hoffmann & Cerbone, 1999; 
McGloin & Thomas, 2016; Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). In addition, the Pathways 
sample has also been used by many scholars to shed light on offender decision making 
(e.g., Anwar & Loughran, 2011; Loughran et al., 2016; Mamayek et al., 2017; Thomas 
et al., 2020). Lastly, because criminal events are considered rather rare events, the 




Self–Reported Offending. Adolescents’ self-reported involvement in antisocial 
and illegal activities is measured using the adapted self-reported offending (SRO) 





responses regarding their engagement in 11 items of different types of crime in the 6-
month recall period: (a) destroyed or damaged property, (b) entered building to steal, 
(c) shoplifted, (d) stolen car/motorcycle, (e) shot someone, (f) shot at someone, (g) 
robbery with weapon, (h) robbery without weapon, (i) beaten up someone badly and 
needed doctor, (j) been in fight, and (k) broke into car to steal. The 11 types of crimes 
are associated with the types of crime asked in the measure of physiological rewards. 
Among these crime types, (b) enter building to steal and (k) broke into car to steal are 
combined to form entering building or car to steal, (e) shot someone and (f) shot at 
someone are collapsed into shot at someone, (g) robbery with weapon and (h) robbery 
without weapon are collapsed to form robbery with/without weapon, and (i) beaten up 
someone badly and needed a doctor and (j) been in a fight are combined to form 
engagement in a fight. Combining these responses prevents potential double-counting 
of the same incident but still captures engagement in these similar types of behavior.  
Given that some participants report an offending frequency that is unreasonably 
high (e.g., over 1,000 offenses) a variety score is used in the current thesis. The variety 
score is calculated by scoring the number of type of offenses the respondent engaged 
in during the recall period, ranging from 0 to 7. For example, if someone were to report 
that they entered a building to steal, stole a car, and been in a fight, they would have a 
variety score of 3, regardless of how many times they committed these acts. A variety 
score is shown to have higher validity and reliability compared to offending frequency, 
as frequency is more vulnerable to outliers (Sweeten, 2012). 
It may also be informative to examine whether the relationships under study are 





crime category better predict that type of offenses. Therefore, crime-specific variety 
scores are also calculated for two aggregated crime types: property crime and violent 
crime. Property crime includes destroyed or damaged property, entered building or car 
to steal, shoplifted, and stolen car/motorcycle. Violent crime includes shot (at) 
someone, robbery with/without weapon, and been in fight. The items for these 
measures and others are also listed in Appendix A. The current thesis uses offending 
measures from wave 3 (i.e., 12 months) to account for temporal ordering of the 
predictors and outcomes. The average variety score for all crimes is 0.810 (SD=1.232), 
for property crimes is 0.267 (SD=0.698), and for violent crimes is 0.543 (SD=0.743).  
Independent Variables 
Impulsivity. Impulsivity is measured using a subscale in the Youth 
Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI). The YPI subscale of impulsivity is the sum of 5 
items which asked the participants to rate how they most often feel or think of certain 
things, consisting of statements like “I prefer to spend my money right away rather than 
save it,” “I consider myself as a pretty impulsive person,” “It often happens that I talk 
first and think later,” “If I get the chance to do something fun, I do it no matter what I 
had been doing before,” and “It often happens that I do things without thinking ahead.” 
The responses were 1 (does not apply at all), 2 (does not apply well), 3 (apply fairly 
well), and 4 (apply very well), with the final impulsivity score ranging from 5-20 
(!=0.65). The mean of individual impulsivity score in wave 2 is 11.73 (SD=3.329), 
and the z-score standardized values will be used in the model. The standardized score 
is used to better interpret the coefficient estimates in the interaction model and an 





There is variation in the level of impulsivity across individuals (M=11.73, 
SD=3.329), even though the sample is comprised of serious delinquents. The 
distribution of impulsivity also demonstrates that some individuals do fall on the lower 
end of the impulsivity scale (Figure 1). This suggests that the sample may not be as 
biased towards higher impulsive individuals as one might initially assume. Social 
desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985) can be a possibility as to why the impulsivity scale 
is lower than expected, such that respondents may report being more thoughtful and 







Figure 1. Distribution of the Impulsivity Scores  
 
 
Anticipated Perceived Physiological Rewards of Crime. Physiological rewards 
of crime are captured using the Indices of Personal Rewards questionnaire. The items 
are adapted from Nagin and Paternoster (1994) to capture the perceived thrill or rush 
of several types of crimes. This measure is the mean of the 7 items: (a) fighting, (b) 
robbery with a gun, (c) stabbing someone, (d) breaking into a store or home, (e) stealing 
clothes from a store, (f) vandalism, and (g) auto theft. Participants responded how much 
thrill or rush it is to engage in each of these acts on a 10-point scale from 0 (no fun or 
kick at all) to 10 (a great deal of fun or kick). If the participant has never committed an 
act, they were asked to rate their prediction of how much thrill or rush they think they 
will get by engaging in the act. Responses from wave 2 are included in the analysis 





(Marquardt, 1980). The mean score for physiological rewards prior to standardization 
is 2.27 (SD=2.49).  
Physiological rewards for specific crime types are also computed. Rewards 
related to property crimes include breaking into a store or home, stealing clothes from 
a store, vandalism, and auto theft. Rewards related to violent crimes include fighting, 
robbery with a gun, and stabbing someone. Although the exact items used in the 
questionnaire for physiological rewards do not completely match those asked in the 
self-report offending survey, the behaviors are highly related. The mean score for 
physiological rewards of property crimes is 2.08 (SD=2.61) and the mean score for 
physiological rewards for violent crimes is 2.53 (SD=2.71).  
The initial descriptive statistics and distribution (Figure 2) of physiological 
rewards show that there is variation between individuals on their levels of perceived 
thrill or rush of crimes. Interestingly though, the overall sample tend to report lower 
levels of physiological rewards with many 0 values (26.09%). There may be three 
speculated reasons for the lower perceived physiological rewards. Experience with 
offending can potentially influence the perception of physiological rewards, so that 
certain types of crime may become less thrilling the more times it is engaged. Because 
the current sample is composed of individuals who have been convicted of a prior 
offense, their prior history with delinquency can reasonably play a role in why the 
rewards measure is heavily skewed. Second, the high proportion of 0 values in 
physiological rewards can likely reflect individuals who value other types of criminal 
rewards more, and for that reason do not perceive crime to be thrilling. Third, social 





similar to the impulsivity scale. Finding crime to be thrilling or exciting may not be a 
positively desired attribute that respondents want to report highly on, which may 
consciously or unconsciously lead to lower answers on their perceived physiological 










Peer Delinquency. Deviant peers are a robust and consistent correlate of 
offending (e.g., Haynie, 2002; McGloin & O’Neill Shermer, 2009; Warr, 2002). 
Additionally, the relationship between peer delinquency and offending is also 
moderated by impulsivity (Thomas & McGloin, 2013), and scholars have noted that 
peers can shape decision making processes (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Hoeben & 
Thomas, 2019). Peer delinquency is measured using a questionnaire adopted from the 
Rochester Youth Study (Thornberry et al., 1994) that asked respondents about their 
friends’ antisocial activities for 12 items (e.g., “During the recall period how many of 
your friends have gotten into a physical fight?”) on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 





the 12 items is computed for the scale (!=0.89). The average peer delinquency score is 
1.963 (SD=0.875). 
Maternal Care. Maternal care is included in the model to control for the 
association between social control and one’s level of impulsivity as well as its potential 
influence on perceived rewards. The measure is adopted from a subscale in the Quality 
of Parental Relationships Inventory (Conger et al., 1994) that assesses maternal 
affective tone to the respondents. The subscale includes 9 items, such as “How often 
does your mother let you know she really cares about you?”1 Respondents rated the 
items on a 4-point scale from 1 (never) to 4 (always), with a higher score indicating a 
more supportive relationship. The mean of the 9 items at wave 2 is used in the analysis 
(!=0.93). The average maternal care score is 3.191 (SD=0.721). 
Perceived Risk of Punishment. Evidence shows that an individual’s perceived 
risk of punishment is related to offending (Loughran et al., 2012; Shulman & 
Cauffman, 2013) and one’s level of impulsivity also has implications on their risk 
perceptions (Wilson et al., 2017). The measure is adopted from Nagin and Paternoster 
(1994) that captures the participant’s perceived certainty of punishment for crime. 
Participants were asked the likelihood that they would be caught and arrested for the 
following 7 items: (a) fighting, (b) robbery with gun, (c) stabbing someone, (d) 
breaking into a store or home, (e) stealing clothes from a store, (f) vandalism, and (g) 
auto theft. The responses range from 0 (no chance) to 10 (absolutely certain to be 
 
1 The “mother” referred to in the questions can be any female adult responsible for raising the 





caught). The measure is taken from wave 2 and the mean of the 7 items is used 
(!=0.90). The average score of perceived risk of punishment is 5.194 (SD=2.989). 
Proportion of Time Spent on the Streets. The time that respondents could spend 
in the community (as opposed to in some sort of institution) can influence the 
opportunity they had to engage in criminal acts. Therefore, the proportion of time in 
the 6-month recall period that the respondent spent outside a facility without 
community access (e.g., prison, jail, detention center, etc.) is included in the analysis 
to control for varying opportunities of offending between individuals. A higher value 
indicates a greater proportion of time spent on the streets. The mean proportion of time 
respondents spent on the streets during the recall period is 0.521. This indicates that the 
average respondent spent about half of the recall period outside an institutional facility, 
which suggests that the self-reported offending measure captures criminal engagement 
for an average of only 3-months instead of the whole 6-month recall period.  
Study Site. The location where the study and interview was conducted is coded 
as 1 for Philadelphia, PA and 0 for Phoenix, AZ.  
Age. Age of the participants at wave 2 is coded as the integer value (e.g., 14 
years and 7 months is coded as 14 years old).2 
Race/Ethnicity. Race and ethnicity of the participants are coded as dummy 
variables for White, Black, Hispanic and Other. The participant’s original self-reported 
race and ethnicity included more granular categories (e.g., Asian, etc.). However, due 
 
2 The continuous measure for age is only available in the restricted dataset. It is highly unlikely that the 
difference between the continuous and integer values of age would affect much of the results. 
Compared to using a continuous measure, the integer measure of age used in the current thesis will 





to the small sample size for certain categories, this coarser variable is provided by the 
Pathways study researchers to preserve the confidentiality of participants in the public 
access data.  
Gender. The gender of the participant is coded 1 as male and 0 as female using 
the participant’s reported gender. 
Socioeconomic Status (SES). SES is measured using the mean of mother and 
father Index of Social Position (ISP) scores at wave 1, which accounts for both maternal 
and paternal education and occupation status (Hollingshead, 1957). Education is coded 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (professional degree) to 7 (less than seven years of 
school). Occupation is also coded on a 7-point scale from 1 (higher executives, 
proprietors, major professionals) to 7 (unskilled employees). If the parent was the 
collateral reporter, responses for education and occupation from the collateral report 
are used. Otherwise, the response with a lower education and occupation from either 
the participant self-report or the collateral report is used. The following is how the ISP 
score is calculated (Hollingshead, 1971): 
"#$ = &''()*+,-.	0'-12 × 7 + 67('*+,-.	0'-12 × 4 
SES is coded missing if both the mother and father education and occupation 
information is missing. If one parent’s scores are unavailable, parental ISP score is 
calculated using the available parent’s information. If either education or occupation 
information is missing, then the same score for one scale is used to derive the score for 
the other. The scale is reverse coded so that lower values indicate lower SES. The mean 





Prior Offending. The experience that individuals have on certain type of 
criminal behaviors may influence their future offending as well their perception of 
physiological rewards. Therefore, history of offending will be included in sensitivity 
tests to control for prior experience with offending. The experience that respondents 
have with prior offending is measured using a lagged dependent variable (Huizinga et 
al., 1991). Respondents at wave 1 were asked if they have ever engaged in offending, 
and respondents at wave 2 were asked about their offending for the 6-month recall 
period. Reponses from wave 1 and wave 2 are combined to capture whether 
respondents have ever engaged in the types of crimes in the dependent variable prior 
to the wave 2 recall period. Measures of prior experience for all crimes, property crime, 
and violent crime are coded as variety scores. The mean score for all crimes is 3.651 
(SD=1.882), for property crime is 1.960 (SD=1.341), and for violent crime is 1.691 
(SD=0.825). 
Analytic Plan 
The current thesis models three outcomes: variety scores for all crimes, property 
crimes, and violent crimes. The self-reported variety scores are count outcomes. A 
Poisson regression or negative binomial regression is more appropriate than OLS in 
testing the model because the use of a linear regression model may lead to inefficient, 
inconsistent, and biased estimates (Long, 1997). The offending variety score does not 
follow a normal distribution and a large portion of responses are 0 (50.44%), making 
the distribution highly right-skewed (Figure 3). Similarly, crime-specific offense 
variety scores are also not normally distributed (Figure 4 and Figure 5) with many cases 





of over-dispersion in the variety score distribution for all crimes (M=0.81, SD=1.232) 
and for property crimes (M=0.267, SD=0.698). Overdispersion is less prominent for 
violent crimes (M=0.543, SD=0.743).  
 







Figure 4. Distribution of Dependent Variable Property Offense Frequency 
 
 








As discussed in Berk and MacDonald (2008), there may be two sources from 
which the observed overdispersion stems. The first is misspecification of the model 
(i.e., omitted variables) and functional form, and the second is excessive variation in 
the stochastic component of the model, which the negative binomial regression could 
potentially solve. Both the Poisson regression and negative binomial regression engage 
in the same expected mean estimation process, so the resulting coefficient estimates 
will be very similar (Berk & MacDonald, 2008). Hence, if the systematic portion of the 
Poisson regression is not correct, the estimates will be biased and inconsistent in both 
count models. The current thesis has attempted to include relevant factors from 
previous work and theories, yet it is difficult to parse out whether the excessive variance 
originates from the systematic or stochastic portion of the model. To stay on the 
cautious side, the main models first employ a Poisson regression. I first compare the 
residual deviations from models with and without some key control variables to get a 
sense of the overdispersion. Subsequent sensitivity tests are conducted using negative 
binomial regression to examine the robustness of the results.3 
One important concern that arises is missing values in the data. From the 
summary table (Table 1), there are missing values across almost all variables. 
Specifically, the impulsivity (17.38%) and the maternal warmth (13.86%) measures 
 
3 The plotted residuals from the Poisson regression for all crime and property crime show that the 
models generally underpredict 0 count and overpredict 1 count, which is reasonable for the 
overdispersion. However, the predicted values come closer to the observed values (i.e., residuals 
become smaller) as I slowly add in key independent variables to the model. Although this is not a test 
to confirm the source of overdispersion, it does suggest that part of the observed overdispersion may 
come from the specification of the model which negative binomial regression cannot address (Berk & 
MacDonald, 2008). Therefore, I decide to conduct the main analyses using Poisson regression with 
negative binomial regression as a robustness check for all crime and property crime. As for violent 
crimes, the plotted residuals from the Poisson regression closely predicts the observed counts, which 





have the most number of missing values. The overall extent of missing cases largely 
represents a constellation of missing values over many variables rather than one 
variable being responsible. Using a listwise deletion method that discards any 
observation with missing values to treat the missing issue would likely result in a loss 
of approximately 35.38% of data, which can result in inefficient and potentially biased 
estimates (Allison, 2001). To use single imputation or regression imputation methods, 
which replaces missing values with mean, median, or predicted values, would 
underestimate the variance in the model, which can potentially lead to not only biased 
estimates but also underestimated standard errors (Allison, 2001). I decide to employ 
multiple imputation chained equations (MICE) to treat missing data on all the variables 
(Rubin, 1987) using Stata’s mi impute chained command. Multiple imputation has 
a couple advantages compared to listwise deletion and single imputation methods. First, 
it uses simulation-based techniques to generate sets of imputations from predictors that 
are more accurate than single imputation estimates (Little & Rubin, 2002). Second, 
results from multiple imputation account for variability of the estimates, which results 
in more accurate estimation of standard errors (Graham et al., 2007; Little & Rubin, 
2002).  
Multiple imputation requires the missing data mechanisms to be missing at 
random (MAR) (Rubin, 1987), which assumes that the probability of missingness may 
be related to observed factors but not to unobserved factors. To more properly estimate 
the missing data, I include all non-missing parameters that are correlated with the 





and estimated over 10 imputations of 20 datasets using a linear function for continuous 







Table 1. Descriptive Statistics before Imputation 
            
Variables  N Mean  SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
     Variety Score (All) 1,260 0.810 1.232 0 7 
     Variety Score (Property) 1,260 0.267 0.698 0 4 
     Variety Score (Violent) 1,260 0.543 0.743 0 3 
Independent Variable       
     Physiological Rewards (All) 1,261 2.274 2.491 0 10 
     Physiological Rewards (Property) 1,261 2.080 2.605 0 10 
     Physiological Rewards (Violent) 1,261 2.532 2.711 0 10 
     Impulsivity 1,079 11.73 3.329 5 20 
Controls      
  Age at Wave 2 1,265 16.55 1.150 14 20 
  Race      
     White 1,306 0.204 0.403 0 1 
     Black 1,306 0.412 0.492 0 1 
     Hispanic  1,306 0.337 0.473 0 1 
     Other 1,306 0.0467 0.211 0 1 
  Male 1,306 0.864 0.342 0 1 
  Socioeconomic Status (SES) 1,298 36.57 12.24 11 77 
  Study Site      
     Philadelphia, PA 1,306 0.516 0.500 0 1 
     Phoenix, AZ 1,306 0.484 0.500 0 1 
  Peer Delinquency 1,221 1.963 0.875 1 5 
  Maternal Warmth 1,125 3.191 0.721 1 4 
  Perceived Risk 1,247 5.194 2.989 0 10 
  Proportion Time Spent on Street 1,262 0.521 0.439 0 1 
  Offense History (All) 1,306 3.645 1.870 0 7 
  Offense History (Property) 1,306 1.958 1.334 0 4 
  Offense History (Violent) 1,306 1.688 0.821 0 3 
      
 






For analysis, the first set of models evaluates the mediation hypothesis by 
regressing offense variety score on impulsivity, physiological rewards, and controls. 
Generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) in Stata is used because it supports 
Poisson regressions and most importantly, it can directly estimate indirect associations 
in the mediation model (Little et al., 2007). The indirect effects of the mediating 
variable are assessed by the Sobel test, or the product-of-coefficients approach 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The Sobel test relies on the assumption that the sampling 
distribution of the mediating effect falls on a standard normal distribution, and violation 
would result in poor performance and concerns of Type I error (MacKinnon et al., 
2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). To evaluate the moderation hypothesis, the second set 
of models include an interaction term of impulsivity and perceived physiological 
rewards. The mediation and moderation models are also investigated for the two crime-
specific offending outcomes (i.e., property crime and violent crime) and reward 
variables. Robust standard errors are estimated to account for potential violation of the 






Chapter 4: Results 
Impulsivity and Rewards 
A preliminary inspection into the difference between impulsivity and 
physiological rewards in the data suggests the two constructs are indeed empirically 
distinct. First, the correlation between the two measures is relatively low (r=0.24; 
Appendix B). Second, an exploratory factor analysis on the 5 items of impulsivity and 
the 7 items of physiological rewards likewise underscores their distinction. Following 
the Kaiser rule (Nunnally, 1967), the factor analysis results yield two factors of 
eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 4.1675 and consisted 
of all items from the impulsivity questionnaire which accounted for 0.8487 of the 
variance. Factor loadings in the first factor range from 0.5747 to 0.8771. All the items 
from the reward questionnaire load onto factor 2, which has an eigenvalue of 1.1863 
and account for further 0.2416 of the variance. Factor loadings in the second factor 
range from 0.3326 to 0.6129. The results do not change when an oblique rotation is 
used. Overall, the correlation and exploratory factor analysis support the idea that 
impulsivity and physiological rewards are conceptually related but are nonetheless 
different constructs. 
Main Analyses 
The imputation step is carried out using all observations that had at least one 
variable with non-missing values in wave 2 and 3 because the imputation model cannot 
estimate values if all variables are missing for an observation. There are 48 respondents 





variables), therefore the final analytic sample includes 1,306 individuals. The inclusion 
of the dependent variable in the imputation step is crucial to preserving the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Johnson & Young, 2011). Without 
including the dependent variable in the imputation model will attenuate any 
relationship the independent variables have with the outcome (Graham, 2009; Johnson 
& Young, 2011). Whether to include imputed values of the dependent variable in the 
analysis is another set of decisions. One method that includes the dependent variable 
in the imputation step but later excludes the missing values in the analysis step (i.e., the 
multiple imputation then deletion, or MID) is suggested when there is high amount of 
missingness in the dependent variable (von Hippel, 2007). Simulation shows that there 
is little difference between estimates from MID and that from keeping the imputed 
values if there is a larger number of imputations and smaller percentage of missing data 
in the dependent variable (Johnson & Young, 2011; von Hippel, 2007). In this case, the 
dependent variable, offending variety score, is missing on 3.52% of the values. 
Therefore, for the current thesis, I decide to keep the imputed values of the dependent 
variables in the analyses.  
Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 report the Poisson analyses for self-reported 
offending on all crimes, property crimes, and violent crimes, respectively. Models 1 in 
the three tables show the relationship between impulsivity and offending with controls 
included. The direct relationships for impulsivity and physiological rewards on crime 
are consistent with expectations and are similar across the crime types (i.e., all, violent, 
and property crimes). For all crimes (Table 2), one standard deviation increase in 





the offending variety score controlling for other factors. Model 2 (Table 2) indicates 
that both impulsivity and physiological rewards have significant direct associations 
with offending, such that a one standard deviation increase in the impulsivity score and 
perceived physiological rewards is associated with 16.6% (b=0.154, p<0.001) and 
23.0% (b=0.207, p<0.001) increase in offending, respectively.  
For crime-specific analyses, Table 3 reports the Poisson models for property 
crime. Model 1 shows that a standard deviation increase in impulsivity score is 
associated with an average 42.2% increase (b=0.352, p<0.001) in property offenses 
controlling for other factors. Model 2 reveals that both impulsivity and physiological 
rewards of property crime have significant direct associations with property offending. 
A one standard deviation increase in impulsivity score is associated with 32.3% 
(b=0.280, p<0.001) increase in property offending and a standard deviation increase in 
perceived physiological rewards is related to 38.5% (b=0.326, p<0.001) increase in 
property offending. For violent crimes, Table 4 shows that both impulsivity alone and 
violent-specific physiological rewards have significant direct associations with violent 
offending (Models 1 and 2). A one standard deviation increase in impulsivity score is 
related to 11.0% (b=0.104, p<0.01) increase in violent offending and a one standard 
deviation increase in perceived physiological rewards is related to 16.6% (b=0.154, 
p<0.001) increase in violent offending, controlling for other factors. 
Across the three offending specifications, I find statistically significant 
mediation relationships for physiological rewards. From the regression model included 
in the GSEM mediation estimation for all crimes, impulsivity positively predicts 





in tables). The indirect effect is tested using the Sobel test. The results in Table 2 
indicate partial mediation by physiological rewards (b=0.030, se=0.0081, p<0.001) and 
the indirect relationship accounts for 16.2% of the total relationship between 
impulsivity and offending with control variables included. For crime-specific results, 
impulsivity is positively associated with physiological rewards of property crime 
(b=0.145, se=0.029, p<0.001; not shown in tables) and violent crime (b=0.123, 
se=0.030, p<0.001; not shown in tables). For property crime, results from the Sobel test 
indicate partial mediation by physiological rewards (b=0.047, se=0.013, p<0.001) and 
the indirect relationship accounts for 14.5% of the total relationship between 
impulsivity and property offending. Whereas for violent crime, the Sobel test shows 
partial mediation by violent-specific physiological rewards (b=0.019, se=0.0063, 
p<0.01) and the indirect relationship accounts for 15.4% of the total association 
between impulsivity and violent offending. 
I also hypothesize that the interaction between impulsivity and rewards will be 
statistically significant, reflecting that individuals with higher impulsivity weigh 
physiological reward more than those with lower impulsivity. Model 3 from Table 2 
shows that there is not a statistically significant moderating relationship for impulsivity 
and physiological rewards. Similarly, I find no statistically significant moderating 
relationship for impulsivity and property-specific physiological rewards (Table 3 
Model 3), nor do I find the interaction term between impulsivity and violent-specific 
physiological rewards to be statistically significant (Table 4 Model 3). 
 The main analyses also discover relationships from other covariates that are 





statistically significant for all three models, suggesting an average lower involvement 
in offending for older participants. Male participants also have greater variety scores in 
general, such that males have an average 80% higher variety score than female 
participants, holding other variables constant. Peer delinquency and perceived risk are 
both significant predictors of offending. A one-level increase in how much the 
participant’s peers are engaged in antisocial activities is related to an average 35.5% 
rise in the individual’s own offending. A one-level increase in perceived risk of arrest 
is associated with a 2.93% lower offending variety score (Model 3).  
The covariates which are significantly related to the property crime variety 
score are partially consistent with those from all crimes (Table 3). The association 
between peer delinquency and property offending has a similar magnitude compared 
to all crimes (Table 2), with a one-level increase in peer delinquency associated to an 
average 37.2% increase in property crime engagement. Perceived risk of arrest is only 
negatively associated with offending in the impulsivity-only model (Model 1), and not 
statistically significant when perceived rewards are included. The participants in 
Philadelphia also have an average lower property crime variety score compared to 
others in Arizona. Unlike the findings from all crimes (Table 2), the age and gender of 
the participant are not statistically significant predictors of property-specific offending. 
Moreover, maternal warmth is negatively associated with property offending, such that 
a one-unit increase in the maternal warmth scale is related to 18.3% lower variety score 
of property crimes. For violence-related crimes, Table 4 suggests that males on average 
have 107.9% greater violent offense variety score compared to female participants, and 





offenses engaged. Peer delinquency and perceived risk of arrest are both statistically 






Table 2. Poisson Models Estimating the Relationship between Impulsivity, 
Physiological Rewards, and Variety Score for All Crimes 
  
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.191*** 0.154*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0423) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.207*** 0.187*** 
  (0.0405) (0.0415) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0546 
   (0.0383) 
Age -0.0822* -0.0694* -0.0685* 
 (0.0340) (0.0333) (0.0333) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 0.0587 0.0486 0.0508 
 (0.194) (0.196) (0.195) 
Black -0.0998 -0.0894 -0.0961 
 (0.196) (0.198) (0.197) 
Hispanic 0.00337 -0.000792 -0.00419 
 (0.189) (0.192) (0.191) 
Male 0.659*** 0.588*** 0.587*** 
 (0.166) (0.164) (0.165) 
SES 0.00134 0.000771 0.000860 
 (0.00335) (0.00328) (0.00327) 
Study Site PA -0.343*** -0.184 -0.169 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) 
Peer Delinquency 0.353*** 0.304*** 0.303*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0412) (0.0414) 
Maternal Warmth -0.0641 -0.0584 -0.0636 
 (0.0577) (0.0566) (0.0568) 
Proportion Time on Street 7.68e-05 -0.00657 -0.00480 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.100) 
Perceived Risk -0.0368* -0.0288 -0.0297* 
 (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Constant 0.272 0.0836 0.0736 
 (0.676) (0.674) (0.675) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Table 3. Poisson Models Estimating the Relationship between Impulsivity, 
Property-Specific Physiological Rewards, and Variety Score for Property 
Crimes  
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.352*** 0.280*** 0.254** 
 (0.0785) (0.0809) (0.0870) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.326*** 0.299*** 
  (0.0624) (0.0694) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0624 
   (0.0692) 
Age -0.0954 -0.0672 -0.0665 
 (0.0606) (0.0603) (0.0602) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 0.552 0.485 0.482 
 (0.405) (0.409) (0.407) 
Black -0.0617 -0.0882 -0.102 
 (0.427) (0.430) (0.429) 
Hispanic 0.482 0.422 0.415 
 (0.400) (0.403) (0.401) 
Male 0.444 0.344 0.342 
 (0.244) (0.238) (0.238) 
SES 0.00201 0.00122 0.00152 
 (0.00564) (0.00555) (0.00553) 
Study Site PA -0.678*** -0.439* -0.419* 
 (0.202) (0.203) (0.207) 
Peer Delinquency 0.386*** 0.316*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0711) (0.0691) (0.0694) 
Maternal Warmth -0.207* -0.202* -0.205* 
 (0.0994) (0.0975) (0.0978) 
Proportion Time on Street -0.195 -0.190 -0.194 
 (0.176) (0.171) (0.171) 
Perceived Risk -0.0507* -0.0390 -0.0401 
 (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0259) 
Constant -0.237 -0.646 -0.653 
 (1.211) (1.218) (1.215) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 4. Poisson Models Estimating the Relationship between Impulsivity, 
Violent-Specific Physiological Rewards, and Variety Score for Violent Crimes  
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.126** 0.104** 0.0965* 
 (0.0397) (0.0395) (0.0403) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.154*** 0.142*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0383) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0396 
   (0.0336) 
Age -0.0734* -0.0696* -0.0691* 
 (0.0318) (0.0314) (0.0315) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White -0.179 -0.161 -0.154 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.171) 
Black -0.158 -0.137 -0.137 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) 
Hispanic -0.215 -0.195 -0.194 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.170) 
Male 0.785*** 0.732*** 0.732*** 
 (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) 
SES 0.00127 0.000549 0.000548 
 (0.00320) (0.00317) (0.00318) 
Study Site PA -0.192* -0.0716 -0.0635 
 (0.0951) (0.0974) (0.0982) 
Peer Delinquency 0.336*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0410) (0.0409) 
Maternal Warmth 0.0198 0.0217 0.0172 
 (0.0569) (0.0562) (0.0568) 
Proportion Time on Street 0.106 0.0918 0.0935 
 (0.0928) (0.0913) (0.0913) 
Perceived Risk -0.0302* -0.0239 -0.0243 
 (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Constant -0.590 -0.630 -0.636 
 (0.637) (0.633) (0.634) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 







I conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of the current 
findings. Following guidance from Berk and MacDonald (2008), because Poisson and 
negative binomial regressions have the same mean estimation process, the estimated 
coefficients from both models do not differ substantially. However, negative binomial 
includes an extra parameter to capture excessive variance (i.e., overdispersion) which 
can yield a more efficient estimate of the standard error if the overdispersion is 
stochastic. It is difficult to parse out the source of overdispersion, therefore I employ 
negative binomial regressions for all crime, property crime, and violent crime as a 
sensitivity check to account for the potential of overdispersion in the stochastic 
component of the models.  
Overall, the negative binomial models support the robustness of the mediation 
and lack of significant moderation findings across the crime types. Table 5 displays the 
negative binomial check for the all crimes analysis. It supports the robustness of the 
mediation findings (b=0.030, se=0.0084, p<0.001 for indirect effect) but likewise 
suggests the interaction term is not statistically significant (Model 3). Similarly, 
negative binomial models (Table 6) confirm the significant mediating relationship for 
property-specific physiological rewards (b=0.049, se=0.014, p<0.001 for indirect 
effect, with controls) as well as the lack of statistical significant moderation effect. The 
negative binomial sensitivity check for violent crime is not presented here in the main 
text because the models initially had issues with convergence. Moreover, when the 
models did eventually converge, the standard errors of alpha (i.e., overdispersion 





violent-specific crimes for readers who may be interested, but with standard errors of 





Table 5. Negative Binomial Models Estimating the Relationship between 
Impulsivity, Physiological Rewards, and Variety Score for All Crimes  
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.195*** 0.158*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0433) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.210*** 0.191*** 
  (0.0427) (0.0436) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0559 
   (0.0395) 
Age -0.0774* -0.0639 -0.0632 
 (0.0342) (0.0338) (0.0339) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 0.0653 0.0552 0.0563 
 (0.183) (0.188) (0.189) 
Black -0.0843 -0.0740 -0.0777 
 (0.187) (0.191) (0.191) 
Hispanic -0.000239 -0.0226 -0.0263 
 (0.177) (0.183) (0.183) 
Male 0.653*** 0.587*** 0.585*** 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.161) 
SES 0.00125 0.000424 0.000456 
 (0.00331) (0.00320) (0.00320) 
Study Site PA -0.310** -0.165 -0.154 
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) 
Peer Delinquency 0.381*** 0.323*** 0.325*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0448) (0.0447) 
Maternal Warmth -0.0714 -0.0614 -0.0663 
 (0.0592) (0.0579) (0.0582) 
Proportion Time on Street 0.0223 0.0174 0.0235 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) 
Perceived Risk -0.0316* -0.0249 -0.0257 
 (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Lnalpha -0.663*** -0.773*** -0.786*** 
 (0.153) (0.166) (0.167) 
Constant 0.106 -0.0641 -0.0775 
 (0.676) (0.673) (0.676) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Table 6. Negative Binomial Models Estimating the Relationship between 
Impulsivity, Property-Specific Physiological Rewards, and Variety Score for 
Property Crimes  
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.357*** 0.295*** 0.275** 
 (0.0846) (0.0856) (0.0898) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.334*** 0.306*** 
  (0.0657) (0.0737) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0718 
   (0.0771) 
Age -0.0943 -0.0643 -0.0613 
 (0.0633) (0.0648) (0.0649) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 0.634 0.567 0.565 
 (0.375) (0.392) (0.394) 
Black 0.00561 -0.0308 -0.0407 
 (0.403) (0.417) (0.420) 
Hispanic 0.495 0.387 0.380 
 (0.366) (0.383) (0.386) 
Male 0.436 0.383 0.378 
 (0.240) (0.233) (0.233) 
SES 0.00231 0.000781 0.000814 
 (0.00570) (0.00562) (0.00561) 
Study Site PA -0.639** -0.424* -0.407 
 (0.207) (0.211) (0.214) 
Peer Delinquency 0.452*** 0.351*** 0.355*** 
 (0.0815) (0.0781) (0.0776) 
Maternal Warmth -0.243* -0.224* -0.228* 
 (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) 
Proportion Time on Street -0.135 -0.115 -0.107 
 (0.183) (0.182) (0.182) 
Perceived Risk -0.0389 -0.0321 -0.0339 
 (0.0278) (0.0283) (0.0282) 
Lnalpha 0.501** 0.349 0.338 
 (0.186) (0.209) (0.209) 
Constant -0.450 -0.836 -0.887 
 (1.227) (1.247) (1.252) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





A second potential concern with the current measures and models is that the 
sample consists of individuals who had prior contact with the criminal justice system 
for various types of crime, along with those who may not have such experience. The 
different offending experiences in the current sample may have two possible influences 
on the measure of physiological rewards. On the one hand, someone with more 
extensive offense history may report physiological rewards differently compared to 
others who may have less experience. On the other hand, reporting of physiological 
rewards on certain crimes that individuals have experience with may differ compared 
to other crimes with which they have no prior experience. Given the nature of the 
dataset, I am unable to disentangle the different influences in the measure. Therefore, 
as the second form of sensitivity analysis, I include a lagged dependent variable (i.e., 
offense history) to account for previous experience with crime. Controlling for a lagged 
dependent variable does not solve the different nuances of how experience can impact 
reward reporting, but it may provide a first step in parsing out this influence.  
Unsurprisingly, prior history of all crimes (Table 7), property offense (Table 8), 
and violent offense (Table 9) are all statistically significant predictors of offending for 
the different types of crime when included in the models. However, as Table 7 
demonstrates, the inclusion of a lagged DV does not alter the support for the mediation 
hypothesis (b=0.018, se=0.006, p<0.01 for indirect effect) nor the moderation 
hypothesis. Table 8 also provide support for the mediation hypothesis (b=0.035, 
se=0.012, p<0.01 for the indirect effect) but not for the moderating relationship when 
controlling for property offense history. Likewise, the mediation hypothesis is 











Table 7. Poisson Models Including the Lagged DV - Offense History for All 
Crimes 
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.134** 0.112** 0.0964* 
 (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0426) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.159*** 0.135** 
  (0.0396) (0.0416) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0619 
   (0.0369) 
Age -0.0995** -0.0862** -0.0849** 
 (0.0333) (0.0327) (0.0326) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 0.0421 0.0386 0.0422 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.193) 
Black -0.0806 -0.0717 -0.0779 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.195) 
Hispanic -0.0230 -0.0325 -0.0380 
 (0.188) (0.190) (0.189) 
Male 0.530** 0.483** 0.481** 
 (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) 
SES 0.000541 5.25e-05 0.000125 
 (0.00328) (0.00323) (0.00322) 
Study Site PA -0.183 -0.0751 -0.0580 
 (0.0989) (0.101) (0.102) 
Peer Delinquency 0.254*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0445) (0.0443) 
Maternal Warmth -0.0449 -0.0426 -0.0484 
 (0.0565) (0.0556) (0.0560) 
Proportion Time on Street 0.136 0.122 0.124 
 (0.102) (0.0999) (0.0999) 
Perceived Risk -0.0231 -0.0178 -0.0186 
 (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
Offense History 0.185*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0244) 
Constant -0.106 -0.241 -0.265 
 (0.682) (0.680) (0.682) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Table 8. Poisson Models Including the Lagged DV - Offense History for 
Property Crimes 
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.292*** 0.240** 0.201* 
 (0.0803) (0.0819) (0.0888) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.280*** 0.240*** 
  (0.0641) (0.0727) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0873 
   (0.0679) 
Age -0.116 -0.0849 -0.0843 
 (0.0596) (0.0598) (0.0595) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 0.484 0.432 0.428 
 (0.413) (0.414) (0.411) 
Black 0.0138 -0.0156 -0.0331 
 (0.432) (0.432) (0.430) 
Hispanic 0.440 0.374 0.359 
 (0.409) (0.409) (0.406) 
Male 0.295 0.211 0.204 
 (0.246) (0.242) (0.242) 
SES 0.00151 0.000707 0.00107 
 (0.00552) (0.00546) (0.00543) 
Study Site PA -0.452* -0.271 -0.239 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.197) 
Peer Delinquency 0.295*** 0.238** 0.238** 
 (0.0758) (0.0730) (0.0725) 
Maternal Warmth -0.182 -0.180 -0.185 
 (0.0956) (0.0943) (0.0945) 
Proportion Time on Street -0.0412 -0.0379 -0.0402 
 (0.175) (0.172) (0.171) 
Perceived Risk -0.0378 -0.0283 -0.0294 
 (0.0259) (0.0267) (0.0266) 
Offense History 0.364*** 0.332*** 0.339*** 
 (0.0649) (0.0669) (0.0677) 
Constant -0.722 -1.091 -1.113 
 (1.236) (1.243) (1.237) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Table 9. Poisson Models Including the Lagged DV - Offense History for Violent 
Crimes 
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.0877* 0.0752 0.0681 
 (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0408) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.114** 0.103** 
  (0.0369) (0.0386) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0360 
   (0.0334) 
Age -0.0864** -0.0818** -0.0809** 
 (0.0311) (0.0307) (0.0308) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White -0.140 -0.126 -0.120 
 (0.168) (0.169) (0.170) 
Black -0.196 -0.175 -0.174 
 (0.171) (0.172) (0.172) 
Hispanic -0.228 -0.217 -0.215 
 (0.164) (0.166) (0.167) 
Male 0.700*** 0.667*** 0.667*** 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 
SES 0.000147 -0.000338 -0.000351 
 (0.00316) (0.00314) (0.00315) 
Study Site PA -0.130 -0.0459 -0.0390 
 (0.0937) (0.0959) (0.0966) 
Peer Delinquency 0.252*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0425) (0.0424) 
Maternal Warmth 0.0324 0.0329 0.0288 
 (0.0563) (0.0559) (0.0566) 
Proportion Time on Street 0.212* 0.192* 0.193* 
 (0.0931) (0.0923) (0.0924) 
Perceived Risk -0.0193 -0.0154 -0.0157 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Offense History 0.316*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0500) (0.0500) 
Constant -0.825 -0.845 -0.856 
 (0.639) (0.636) (0.638) 
    
Observations 1,306 1,306 1,306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Chapter 5: Discussion  
Prior studies demonstrate that individuals who are more impulsive tend to 
engage in more delinquency and risk taking (e.g., Lynam & Miller, 2004; Wright et al., 
2004). Studies also consistently illustrate a strong association between criminal 
rewards and offending (e.g., Baker & Piquero, 2010; Loughran et al., 2016; Matsueda 
et al., 2006). Despite the similarity and overlap in impulsivity and reward processing 
in the literature, there is considerably little evidence on how rewards “matter” in one’s 
decision to offend. Therefore, the current thesis examines the role of physiological 
rewards in the impulsivity-offending relationship.  
Using data from the Pathways to Desistance study, the analyses reveal that 
impulsivity and physiological rewards are both positively related to higher engagement 
in offending variety scores for all crimes, property crime, and violent crime. The direct 
relationship between rewards and crime is consistent with expectations from rational 
choice theory and social learning theory, which both assert that criminal rewards are 
predictive of greater offending (e.g., Hoeben & Thomas, 2019; Loughran et al., 2016). 
It is also supportive of Katz’s (1988) notion that the thrill and rush of crime (i.e., 
“sneaky thrills”) are important, especially for property crimes. Besides rewards, the 
direct and positive association between impulsivity and offending is in agreement with 
the general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) as well as numerous other 
studies (e.g., Lynam & Miller, 2004; Pratt & Cullen, 2000).  
 I also analyze the mediating role of physiological rewards in order to assess 
whether individuals with lower or higher impulsivity may perceive rewards differently 





mediation hypothesis that physiological rewards partially explain the relationship 
between impulsivity and offending, which suggests that individuals with higher levels 
of impulsivity may on average engage in more offending behaviors at least partly 
through the anticipation of greater thrill or rush. This is consistent with prior studies 
that indicate low self-control indirectly shapes offending behavior through 
physiological rewards (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993) and perceived pleasure of crime 
(Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996). The mediation analysis in this thesis differs from the earlier 
works in mainly two ways: one, it examines actual engagement in offending behavior 
rather than the intention to offend in hypothetical scenarios (i.e., vignettes), and two, it 
conceptually distinguishes impulsivity from low self-control. As previously discussed, 
it is important to understand impulsivity and self-control separately as they may have 
different contributions to offending (Mamayek et al., 2017). 
This mediation finding arguably provides support for dual-process theories. If 
reward expectation for individuals with higher impulsivity are more likely to be 
influenced by feelings of excitement and heuristics due to a greater reliance of Type I 
processing (Quartz, 2009), this may suggest that higher impulsivity is associated with 
greater perception of rewards. Indeed, I find that individuals with higher impulsivity 
anticipate greater pleasures compared to those who are less impulsive. This also has 
implications on other criminological theories as well. Rational choice theory and social 
learning theory are both inherently perceptual, such that the determination of and 
weight of rewards (and costs) are subjective to the individual decisionmaker. On the 
other hand, the general theory of crime believes that self-control explains criminal 





framework to explain how individual attributes like impulsivity can influence the 
perception (i.e., mediation) of pleasures and pain. The thesis echoes calls made from 
Nagin and Paternoster (1993) to explore mechanisms in which impulsivity affects 
choice making as well as suggestions from Mamayek and colleagues (2015) on the use 
of the dual-process framework to inform theories of both criminal propensity and 
decision making. It is imperative for subsequent research to further understand different 
mechanisms through which impulsivity can affect the anticipation of the benefits or 
costs of crime.  
 This thesis also hypothesizes that individuals may be differentially sensitive to 
physiological rewards according to their level of impulsivity. However, the interaction 
terms between impulsivity and rewards are not statistically significant for the main 
analysis, nor the crime-specific analyses. Accordingly, I do not find evidence that 
individuals with varying levels of impulsivity will be differentially susceptible to 
greater or lower levels of physiological rewards. This is not consistent with the 
expectations from psychology or behavioral economics (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; 
Kahneman, 2011; Mamayek et al., 2015). Prior literature alludes to the potential of a 
moderating relationship between impulsivity and rewards, but few test it with 
observational data. For instance, using survey data on college students, Sellers (1999) 
finds a significant negative moderating effect of self-control and rewards on self-
reported intimate violence. She concludes that the finding may be due to the types of 
perceived rewards asked (e.g., social rewards) and the rewards may not be considered 
immediate to the crime. The thesis mainly differs by using longitudinal data on serious 





physiological rewards (not social or general rewards), and more general offending 
outcomes (not just courtship aggression).  
A potential reason for why a moderation relationship is not found between 
impulsivity and physiological rewards may be that moderating effects are state-
dependent, such that the value of the reward is contingent upon the context which the 
reward is in. From dual-process theories, Type I thinking may be more prominent when 
a short-term reward is presented in a situation because Type I processing will produce 
a quick and intuitive response to the immediate circumstance (Evans, 2003; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). However, asking participants to anticipate how they feel during 
criminal events may be tapping into Type II decision making because the act requires 
recall or hypothetical thinking from the participant (Evans, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Additionally, it is likely unreasonable to assume that rewards are stable across 
situations, so it is possible that the current measure of physiological rewards may not 
be the most ideal to capture what participants actually feel during criminal decision 
making.  
Because it may be possible that the moderating effect of impulsivity and 
rewards may matter more in context, future studies can use more situational 
measurements of physiological rewards to better capture immediate rewards associated 
with the criminal act. Ideally, the measure should assess the value of physiological 
rewards anticipated immediately prior to the criminal act (i.e., the time of the criminal 
event decision, Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Prior works on deterrence or rational choice 
also endorse the use of measures that can better assess perceptions of crime that are 





measure of criminal rewards used in the thesis may be too remote from actual offending 
to capture the influence of situationally-immediate rewards. Unfortunately, this type of 
situational measure may be challenging to collect in an actual study. For this reason, 
vignette studies and scenarios, like the ones used in Nagin and Paternoster (1993) and 
Piquero and Tibbetts (1996), may provide a closer solution to capturing the situational 
values of rewards to the extent that the vignettes can elicit feelings of thrill or rush. 
Another solution suggested by prior works is to provide more context in the questions 
to capture perceptions of rewards, costs, and risks more specifically (e.g., Piliavin et 
al., 1986). For example, asking one’s perception of rewards in a detailed situation (e.g., 
specific type of crime, place, time, etc.) rather than in general. One other potential 
design is using virtual reality to simulate conditions that present physiological rewards 
(van Gelder et al., 2019). In a virtual reality study, researchers may better capture 
individual’s immediate feelings of thrill or rush for a predesigned criminal event. 
Overall, it is important for future research to further explore whether impulsivity can 
influence the preference for physiological reward because the current findings are not 
significant. 
The current measure of physiological rewards may not be ideal for the 
moderation analysis, but it may be more adequate to study mediation. When 
respondents are asked about how much thrill or rush they feel in certain crimes, 
individuals who are more impulsive may tend to report higher thrill possibly because 
of an automatic Type I response that associates their perception of thrill to crime. This 
may be similar to the earlier example of the statement “all dogs have a tail,” to which 





individuals may read the rewards question and report their immediate perception of 
physiological rewards that comes to mind. Therefore, the physiological rewards 
measure can possibly prompt a Type I response to how people feel about crime, but the 
measure is insufficient to capture the physiological rewards that are present in the 
immediate criminal situation, which is more important for the moderation relationship. 
Future work can attempt to use more detailed version of the current rewards measure 
and combine it with suggestions discussed earlier (e.g., vignettes, virtual reality) to 
confirm the mediating and moderating relationship.  
In addition, two other factors related to measurement are also worth discussing. 
From Figure 1 and Figure 2 presented earlier, the distribution of impulsivity and 
physiological rewards are lower than what prior literature would anticipate. It is 
possible that social desirability bias, which is the conscious or unconscious tendency 
to give positive or socially-acceptable answers (Nederhof, 1985), played a role in the 
responses to these questionnaires. The findings will not be affected substantially if 
social desirability bias exerts the same influence on all individuals. Yet, if the size of 
the bias are different for each respondent with no specific pattern, then it introduces 
more variance in the measurement that can lead to a higher likelihood to find a null 
result. If there is a pattern where individuals of certain characteristics systematically 
report lower impulsivity or rewards, then the estimates for the two measures can 
potentially be biased if those characteristics that influence social desirability are not 
controlled for in the model. Another factor relates to the length of recall period in the 
current thesis. Because the average respondent spent half of the recall period on the 





rather than the full 6 months. The shortened recall period can also limit the ability to 
find statistical significance from capturing fewer criminal occurrences.  
Aside from limitations in measurement, there are several other limitations in 
the current thesis. First, as discussed in a previous section, the thesis is restricted in its 
ability to generalize beyond the current sample, and the sample is not representative of 
the broader juvenile offender population nor the general population. Future 
investigations may be able to benefit from utilizing different samples. One interesting 
avenue to explore is whether the thesis findings differ for older or younger individuals. 
For example, whether age can moderate the extent to which more impulsive individuals 
perceive physiological rewards, and how it relates to offending. In the Pathways data, 
the average participant at wave 2 is in their late adolescence (i.e., 16.55 years old). 
Given that adolescence is marked as a period of significant developmental changes in 
decision making (Albert & Steinberg, 2011), the relationships that physiological 
rewards have with impulsivity and delinquency in this period may differ compared to 
those in other age groups. Steinberg (2010) finds that impulsivity and reward-seeking 
have two different developmental trajectories in adolescents, with impulsivity steadily 
declining and reward-seeking declining curvilinearly over time. This creates a period 
during mid-adolescence when individuals have heightened sensation seeking tendency 
but not enough impulse control, which is hypothesized to lead to more engagement in 
risky activities. Future work can disentangle this relationship with data that follow 
individuals from their early adolescence to young adults.  
Second, the thesis focuses on the rewarding aspect of crime, hence the 





it is possible that the costs and risks of crime also influence the relationship between 
impulsivity and offending. Nagin and Paternoster (1993) find that low self-control 
predicts not only higher perception of criminal rewards but also lower perception of 
criminal sanctions and shame. On the other hand, Nagin and Paternoster (1994) find 
that individuals who are more present-oriented and self-interested are on average less 
likely to be deterred by the perceived risk of crime (i.e., losing one’s social capital). 
Future scholars can explore the complex dynamics of impulsivity, costs, risks, and 
rewards. For example, it would be fruitful to more fully understand how impulsivity 
influence perceptions of rewards, costs, and risks under the dual-process model. 
Consideration of the costs of crime may be more associated with Type II processing 
because these costs can be more distant in the future. Additionally, future studies can 
understand how situationally-dependent perceptions of costs, risks, and rewards might 
differentially relate to offending outcome depending on one’s impulsivity.  
Third, the analyses illuminate roles that physiological rewards may play in the 
impulsivity-offending relationship, but the present design could not provide causal 
conclusions. I attempt to include most of the theoretically relevant variables in the 
model, but there is still a possibility of omitted variable bias from unobserved factors 
or other variables that are not included. Although researchers may not be able to 
manipulate one’s impulsivity, future studies can aim to use experimental or quasi-
experimental methods to change the scenario or reward presented. For example, studies 
can match individuals with higher impulsivity to those with lower impulsivity and 





Or, studies can manipulate the amount of immediate rewards presented in a situation 
and explore whether individuals with varying levels of impulsivity respond differently. 
 In summary, the current thesis provides a preliminary evaluation of the role that 
physiological rewards have on impulsivity and offending decision making. I find 
support for rewards partially mediating the relationship between impulsivity and 
offending, but I do not find significant moderation effects. This suggests that 
individuals with higher impulsivity on average perceive greater thrill from crime, yet 
the physiological rewards do not have a stronger association to crime in those who are 
more impulsive. From my findings, I propose ways in which dual-process theories and 
traditional theories of crime can be advanced to better understand offending. For 
instance, impulsivity and rewards can complement each other in explaining crime. 
Lastly, the current thesis encourages future scholars to explore the dynamics between 









Appendix A. Measures of the variables used in the thesis 
 
Variable Definition Values 
Dependent Variable   
    Variety Score All Offenses …. The number of the types of offenses reported in the 
SRO at wave 3 (12-month interview). The questions 
asked the participant whether they engaged in the act 
in the recall period for the following 11 items:  
(a) destroyed/damaged property 
(b) entered building to steal  
(c) shoplifted  
(d) stolen car/motorcycle  
(e) shot someone (where bullet hit) 
(f) shot at someone (pulled trigger) 
(g) took something by force using weapon 
(h) took something by force no weapon 
(i) beaten up somebody badly needed doctor  
(j) been in a fight  
(k) broke into car to steal  
The variety score ranges from 0 
(none) to 7 (committed all 
types of offenses). A higher 
score indicates higher self-
reported engagement in 
antisocial or delinquent 





Crime types (b) and (k) are collapsed, (e) and (f) are 
collapsed, (g) and (h) are collapsed, (i) and (j) are 
collapsed.  
    Variety Score Property  
                     Offenses……… 
The number of the types of offenses reported in the 
SRO at wave 3 (12-month interview). The questions 
asked the participant whether they engaged in the act 
in the recall period for the following 5 items:  
(a) destroyed/damaged property 
(b) entered building to steal  
(c) shoplifted  
(d) stolen car/motorcycle  
(e) broke into car to steal 
Crime types (b) and (e) are collapsed. 
The variety score ranges from 0 
(none) to 4 (committed all 
types of offenses). A higher 
score indicates higher self-
reported engagement in 
property offenses in the recall 
period. 
    Variety Score Violent  
                     Offenses………… 
The number of the types of offenses reported in the 
SRO at wave 3 (12-month interview). The questions 
asked the participant whether they engaged in the act 
in the recall period for the following 6 items:   
(a) shot someone (where bullet hit) 
(b) shot at someone (pulled trigger) 
(c) took something by force using weapon 
(d) took something by force no weapon 
(e) beaten up somebody badly needed doctor  
(f) been in a fight  
Crime types (a) and (b) are collapsed, (c) and (d) are 
collapsed, and (e) and (f) are collapsed. 
The variety score ranges from 0 
(none) to 3 (committed all 
types of offenses). A higher 
score indicates higher self-
reported engagement in violent 
offenses in the recall period. 
Independent Variables   
    Impulsivity (YPI) …………. The YPI impulsivity subscale at wave 2. The subscale 
is a sum of 5 items: 
The original responses were 1 
(does not apply at all), 2 (does 





(a) I prefer to spend my money right away rather than 
save it. 
(b) I consider myself as a pretty impulsive person. 
(c) It often happens that I talk first and think later.  
(d) If I get the chance to do something fun, I do it no 
matter what I had been doing before.  
(e) If often happens that I do things without thinking 
ahead. 
fairly well), and 4 (applied 
very well). The subscale 
ranged from 5-20.  
    Physiological Rewards ……… Z-score standardized value for physiological rewards 
scale, which is a mean of 7 items. This is at wave 2. 
The question asked participants how much thrill or 
rush it is to do any of the following acts: 
(a) fighting  
(b) robbery with a gun  
(c) stabbing someone  
(d) breaking into a store or home 
(e) stealing clothes from a store  
(f) vandalism  
(g) auto theft  
The original responses were 0 
(no fun or kick at all) to 10 (a 
great deal of fun or kick). 
    Physiological Rewards  
                (Property)………… 
Z-score standardized value for physiological rewards 
scale, which is a mean of 3 items. This is at wave 2. 
The question asked participants how much thrill or 
rush it is to do any of the following acts: 
(a) fighting  
(b) robbery with a gun  
(c) stabbing someone  
The original responses were 0 
(no fun or kick at all) to 10 (a 
great deal of fun or kick). 
    Physiological Rewards  
               (Violent)…………… 
Z-score standardized value for physiological rewards 
scale, which is a mean of 4 items. This is at wave 2. 
The question asked participants how much thrill or 
rush it is to do any of the following acts: 
(a) breaking into a store or home 
(b) stealing clothes from a store  
(c) vandalism  
The original responses were 0 
(no fun or kick at all) to 10 (a 





(d) auto theft 
Control Variables   
    Peer Delinquency …………… Mean of 12 items asking the respondent about their 
friends’ antisocial activities at wave 2:  
During the recall period, how many of your friends 
have… 
(a) purposely damaged or destroyed property that did 
not belong to them? 
(b) hit or threatened to hit someone? 
(c) sold drugs? 
(d) gotten drunk once in a while? 
(e) carried a knife? 
(f) carried a gun? 
(g) owned a gun? 
(h) gotten into a physical fight? 
(i) been hurt in a fight? 
(j) stolen something worth more than $100? 
(k) taken a motor vehicle or stolen a car? 
(l) gone in or tried to go into a building to steal 
something? 
The responses were 1 (none of 
them), 2 (very few of them), 3 
(some of them), 4 (most of 
them), and 5 (all of them). 
    Maternal Care ………………. Mean of 9 items asking the respondent about their 
mother’s warmth in their relationship at wave 2: 
When you and your mother have spent time talking or 
doing things together, how often did your mother… 
(a) help you do something that was important? 
(b) let you know she really cares about you? 
(c) listen carefully to your point of view? 
(d) act supportive and understanding toward you? 
(e) act loving or affectionate towards you? 
The responses were 1 (never), 2 






(f) have a good laugh with you about something that 
was funny? 
(g) let you know that she appreciates you, your ideas, 
or the things you do? 
(h) tell you she loves you? 
(i) understand the way you feel about things? 
    Perceived Risk of  
                Punishment ………….. 
The mean of 7 items that asked the participants their 
perceptions of the certainty of punishment at wave 2. 
They were asked how likely is it that they will be 
caught and arrested for the following crimes: 
(a) fighting 
(b) robbery with gun 
(c) stabbing someone 
(d) breaking into a store or home 
(e) stealing clothes from a store 
(f) vandalism  
(g) auto theft  
The original responses were 0 
(no chance) to 10 (absolutely 
certain to be caught). 
    Proportion of time spent on the  
                streets………………… 
This measure is at wave 2. The proportion of the time 
(days) during the recall period that the respondent spent 
outside of facilities without community access, which 
include: 
(a) drug/alcohol facility 
(b) psychiatric facility 
(c) jail/prison 
(d) detention center 
(e) YDC/ADJC 
(f) contracted residential facilities (general and mental 
health)  
The values range from 0 to 1. 
    
Age …………………………... 
Age of the participant at baseline and at wave 2. Integer values in years. 
    Male ………………………… Dummy variable indicating whether the participant was 
male. 





    Study Site (Philadelphia) …… Study site location. Dummy variable indicating the 
study site was Philadelphia, PA. 
1 = Philadelphia, PA;  
0 = Phoenix, AZ 
    Race/Ethnicity   
        White ……………………. Dummy variable indicating the participant is White. 1 = White; 0 = Non-White 
        Black ……………………. Dummy variable indicating the participant is Black. 1 = Black; 0 = Non-Black 
        Hispanic ………………… Dummy variable indicating the participant is Hispanic. 1 = Hispanic; 0 = Non-Hispanic 
        Other ……………………. Dummy variable indicating the participant is neither 
White, Hispanic, or Black. 
1= Other race/ethnicity 
    Socioeconomic Status (SES)… Parental index of social position (ISP) at baseline, 
calculated using mean of mother and father 
occupation and education score (Hollingshead, 1971): 
!""#$%&'!(	*"!+, × 7 + ,0#"%&'!(	*"!+, × 4 
Score range from 11-77 with 
higher scores indicating higher 
SES. 
    Offense History ……………. 
              (Property ……………..) 
              (Violent ………………) 
Lagged dependent variable. The number of the types of 
offenses reported in the SRO at wave 1 and 2 (6-
month interview) combined. The questions asked the 
participant whether they have ever engaged in the act 
and whether they engaged the act in the recall period 
for the following 11 items. The property offense 
history variable includes (a), (b), (c), (d), (k), and the 
violent offense history variable includes (e), (f), (g), 
(h), (i), (j).  
(a) destroyed/damaged property 
(b) entered building to steal  
(c) shoplifted  
(d) stolen car/motorcycle  
(e) shot someone (where bullet hit) 
(f) shot at someone (pulled trigger) 
(g) took something by force using weapon 
The variety score ranges from 0 
to 7 for all offenses, 0 to 4 for 
property offenses, and 0 to 3 
for violent offenses. A higher 
score indicates higher self-
reported history of antisocial 





(h) took something by force no weapon 
(i) beaten up somebody badly needed doctor  
(j) been in a fight  
(k) broke into car to steal 
Crime types (b) and (k) are collapsed, (e) and (f) are 










Appendix B.  
 





  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Variety Score All Crime 1                
2. Physiological Rewards 0.33 1               
3. Impulsivity 0.19 0.24 1              
4. Age -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 1             
5. White 0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.02 1            
6. Black -0.13 -0.27 -0.13 0.03 -0.43 1           
7. Hispanic 0.11 0.15 0.03 -0.05 -0.36 -0.61 1          
8. Other Race 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.11 -0.18 -0.15 1         
9. Male 0.13 0.13 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.02 1        
10. SES -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.12 -0.35 0.05 -0.05 1       
11. Study Site PA -0.15 -0.33 -0.14 0.05 -0.27 0.65 -0.40 -0.11 0.04 0.05 1      
12. Peer Delinquency 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.09 0.00 0.14 -0.06 -0.02 1     
13. Maternal Warmth -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 -0.01 -0.10 0.17 -0.09 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.19 -0.07 1    
14. Proportion Time on Street -0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.16 -0.25 0.11 0.04 -0.20 0.05 -0.31 -0.17 -0.23 1   
15. Perceived Risk -0.14 -0.11 -0.06 -0.14 0.13 -0.11 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 0.03 -0.17 -0.25 -0.01 0.16 1  





Appendix C.  
 
Table 11. Negative Binomial Models Estimating the Relationship between 
Impulsivity, Violent-Specific Physiological Rewards, and Variety Score for 
Violent Crimes  
 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Impulsivity 0.126** 0.104** 0.0965* 
 (0.0397) (0.0395) (0.0403) 
Physiological Rewards - 0.154*** 0.142*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0383) 
Impulsivity x Rewards - - 0.0396 
   (0.0336) 
Age -0.0734* -0.0696* -0.0691* 
 (0.0318) (0.0314) (0.0315) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White -0.179 -0.161 -0.154 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.171) 
Black -0.158 -0.137 -0.137 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) 
Hispanic -0.215 -0.195 -0.194 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.170) 
Male 0.785*** 0.732*** 0.732*** 
 (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) 
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